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Eugen Enyvvari’s Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian 
Participation in Early Phenomenology 
 
Abstract: Despite attending Husserl’s classes, his participation in the discussions of the 
Göttingen phenomenological circle, and his prolific writings on phenomenology, Eugen 
Enyvvari (1884-1959) seems to have been virtually ignored by phenomenological scholarship. 
I use an array of unpublished sources and a survey of his juvenilia to reconstruct Enyvvari’s 
biography and intellectual formation, including his confrontation with Melchior Palagyi’s 
critique of Husserl and Bolzano. Based on both his reports and records from the Göttingen 
University Archives, I attempt to establish the influences to which he could have been exposed 
in Göttingen. I rely on a careful micro-analysis of the development of Husserl’s notion of 
noematical meaning around Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen in order to asses Enyvvari’s specific 
contribution to phenomenology and his significance from the point of view of the general 
historiography of phenomenology. 
 
1 Introduction 
A student of Husserl and early phenomenologist Eugen Enyvvari (original name Enyvvári Jenő1) 
certainly deserves more attention than the almost complete ignorance that contemporary 
phenomenological scholarship shows of him.2 Born in Budapest in 1884, Enyvvari studied at 
the University in Göttingen in the winter semester of 1909/1910, where he attended not only a 
lecture course and advanced seminar given by Husserl, but also the lecture course of Adolf 
Reinach, who had received his habilitation in the previous semester. In a certificate issued to 
him personally by Husserl at the end of the semester, Enyvvari is attested as a student with 
                                                 
1 The family name is a Hungaricisation (literal translation) from Leimstädter in the 1880s. 
2 Enyvvari is not mentioned in any of the standard reference works on the history of phenomenology (K. 
Schuhmann 1977; Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 1982; Moran 2000). The present author is also not aware of 
any phenomenological secondary literature on Enyvvari either. In March 4, 1985, Karl Schuhmann was told 
in a letter by [removed for the purposes of blind review] about the existence of Enyvvari. Schuhmann intended 
to include Enyvvari in the planned revised edition of his chronology of Husserl (K. Schuhmann 1977). This 
revised edition was never completed, but he did mention Enyvvari in a short footnote appended to the version 
of the Reinach biography published in the critical edition of Reinach’s works (see Reinach 1989, 2:620, n. 3), 
Schuhmann’s claim that Enyvvari “nur sehr wenig publiziert hat,” however, is far from being true. 
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“extraordinary enthusiasm and diligence, thoroughness and competence”  in addition to 
“enthusiastic dedication to the most difficult problems of epistemology,” which, Husserl says, 
“led to capture my special sympathies” (see Appendix). As if that were not enough to awaken 
academic interest in him, Enyvvari has himself reported that discussions with Reinach and 
Theodor Conrad in the nascent Göttingen Philosophical Society led him to reject Husserl’s 
theory on the “phenomenological origins of the unity of meaning.”3 In the course of the late 
pre-war years, Enyvvari also published extensively on phenomenology, including a 
phenomenologically coloured dictionary (Enyvvári 1918), and, furthermore, a fifty-five page 
long booklet providing an exposition of Husserl’s phenomenology (Enyvvári 1913; first 
published as a journal article), which might count as one of the first, if not the very first, general 
book on Husserl (i.e. that is neither a comparative work nor an investigation of a specific 
phenomenological problem). A German article written by Enyvvari in 1914 was considered for 
inclusion in the bibliography section of Husserl’s Encyclopaedia Britannica article on 
phenomenology in 1927.4 
The virtual silence surrounding Enyvvari, of course, is not without reasons. Enyvvari  published 
almost exclusively in his mother tongue, Hungarian, and his aforementioned single German 
publication (Enyvvári 1914) had appeared in April 1914, i.e., shortly before the Muses were 
silenced (though he managed to send a dedicated copy to Husserl, which is preserved in 
Husserl’s library5). Enyvvari would not have been completely forgotten, if his life had not taken 
a turn in a different direction. Despite some promising initial signs (and Husserl’s words of 
recommendation), Enyvvari had failed to develop a profession career in philosophy and 
gradually shifted towards the profession of a librarian. Furthermore, because of the highly 
technical character of his writings, which are hard to assess for a critic not versed in the specific 
terminology of Bolzano and the early Phenomenological Movement, Enyvvari was also ignored 
by the philosophical historiography of his native country. Even though it is impossible to 
overlook the existence of his writings, none of the references to him goes beyond the confines 
                                                 
3 Enyvvári 1910, 194, n. 1 – Unless otherwise noted, all translation are from the present author. For obvious 
reasons, it is decided not to include the Hungarian originals. German quotations are left untranslated, unless 
standard translations are available. 
4 Ms. M III 10 III 7 / 1a (the list also bears annotations by Husserl’s hand). 
5 Ms. SP 74. Its title page carries the dedication: “Herrn Prof. Edmund Husserl überreicht von seinem 
dankbaren Schüler E[ugen] Enyv[v]ári”. 
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of a brief encíclopaedia entry. Even the most simple details of his intellectual biography – e.g. 
whether he obtained a doctoral degree in philosophy or in which semester  exactly he studied 
in Göttingen – are omitted or reported contradictorily.6 
In what follows I attempt to present and assess Enyvvari’s contribution based on the careful 
reconstruction of primary sources, including not only his writings in Hungarian but also 
unpublished archival material.7 My aim, however, is not merely to help Enyvvari secure his 
share of philosophical attention that, I think, every early phenomenologist and Husserl-student 
would justly deserve, but I also believe that his work carries a philosophical significance of its 
own, or, at least, could occasion relevant discussions on both specific phenomenological 
problems and the general historiographical framework of Early Phenomenology. 
2 The road to Göttingen 
2.1 The Philosophical Formation 
His father being a civil servant, the early years of Eugen Enyvvari’s intellectual formation 
remained within the unspectacular confines of middle class education. He attended a renowned 
municipal secondary school in Budapest, though the results of his maturity examination in June 
1902 already manifested a philosophical inclination. 8  In the following winter semester he 
matriculated at the University of Budapest, where he studied until the summer semester of 
1906.9 Unfortunately, the archival records do not make it possible to reconstruct the exact 
                                                 
6 The entry on Enyvvari in the New Hungarian Biographical Dictionary (Budapest: 2001, II:366-367), e.g., 
claims that Enyvvari “earned a doctoral degree in humanities at the University of Budapest in 1905” (p. 366). 
In the records of the University Archives of Budapest there is no entry for his alleged doctoral examination. 
7 Besides the notes explicitly mentioned below, I was also relying on Enyvvari’s own manually bound collection 
of his offprints, which bears annotations presumably from his own hand, and Enyvvari’s biographical letter to 
Pál Gulyás (1881-1936) a lexicographer whose project of a comprehensive national biographical dictionary 
was forcefully terminated after the Second World War (Ms. National Széchényi Library (OSZK) Fond 36/175). 
Data on Enyvvari’s later career as a librarian is based on the history of the Municipal Library of Budapest 
(Katsányi 2004), which, unfortunately, leaves Enyvvari as a philosopher completely in darkness. 
8 Enyvvari received the grade “excellent” (the best of the five possible grades) in philosophical propedeutics 
and religious studies, while in other subjects, except for freehand drawing, he was awarded “good” (the second 
best) or “sufficient” (just above the failing level). Ms. Budapest City Archives (BFL), VI.502.d (II. ker., 
1902.1.6/8). 
9 Data are based on the historical almanacs of the university, consulted in the University Archives of Budapest. 
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course of his studies, but it is possible to conjecture some of the classes he attended, since 
Enyvvari as teacher trainee  was explicitly required to attend certain lectures on the history of 
philosophy. This part of the university curriculum was dominated by Bernát Alexander (1850-
1927). Alexander, a local academic heavyweight who co-translated and commented on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason before the turn of the century, was lecturing precisely on the history 
of modern philosophy in the academic year 1902/1903 when Enyvvari entered the university. 
If we look into a student transcript of these lectures, which might have laid the groundwork of 
Enyvvari’s historical knowledge and preferences in philosophy,10 we find that in the section on 
contemporary philosophy Alexander, not surrisingly, portrayed the revival of Kantianism as 
the most promising development, though he put a surprisingly strong emphasis on the 
significance of empirically inclined thinkers like Lotze, Wundt and Fechner (Alexander 1904, 
2:96–97). This type of education apparently did not fail to exercise its influence. Starting from 
the third semester of his studies, Enyvvari published a series of reviews in the progressive 
monthly Huszadik Század (The Twentieth Century), and some of his juvenilia already showed 
him well versed in Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy (beyond manifesting his interest in a 
broadly conceived socialism, which helped him secure the support of Ervin Szabo, the director 
of the progressively inspired Municipal Library of Budapest, who recommended Enyvvari for 
an internship  in June 1904).  
In a review of book preaching monism, the dominant scientific world view of late 19th century, 
Enyvvari argued clearly against conflating logic and psychology: “Logic cannot be 
psychologised” (Enyvvári 1905, 557). The reason for their difference is namely that “logic is 
concerned with the validity of the functions of knowledge, which is totally independent from 
its psychogenesis” (ibid.). Logic and psychology, however, are not unrelated either, since it is 
certain that every thinking is a psychological process” (ibid.). Even though Enyvvari’s 
argument was still cushioned in the Neo-Kantian terms of his professors, his claim clearly 
indicates a susceptibility for a non-trivial reception of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
2.2 Enyvvari’s Reply to Palagyi’s Critique of Husserl 
For every Hungarian philosopher in the first decade of the century, however, there was a serious 
roadblock on the intellectual path towards embracing Husserlian phenomenology. This 
roadblock was created by another Hungarian scientist and philosopher, Melchior Palagyi (or 
                                                 
10 The curriculum of philosophy in the secondary schools  was not historically oriented. 
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Palágyi Menyhért, 1859-1924), who is certainly the most known Hungarian interlocutor of 
Husserl.. Palagyi had already been an established natural scientist, when, during an academic 
peregrination in Germany in the years 1900–1903, he published a series of books in German, 
in which he tried to join cutting-edge academic debates of contemporaneous German 
philosophy. In one of these books (1902a), Palagyi capitalized on the surge of interest in 
Bolzano,11 while in another he explicitly turned against Husserl, whom he perceived as a 
“symptomatic example” of the “metamorphosis of a psychologicist into the contrary position 
of formalism,” a position he believed was “initiated” by Bernard Bolzano himself (Palágyi 
1902b, 9). The fact that Palagyi’s latter booklet not only contained a strongly worded polemic 
against Husserl (Palágyi 1902b, 11 ff.) but some of his suggestions were on the verge of 
accusing Husserl of plagiarising Bolzano’s ideas12 led Husserl in 1903 to publish an equally 
strongly worded and annihilating counter-critique (Husserl 1979, 152–161). This book by 
Palágyi was also believed to have been instrumental in Johannes Daubert’s famous lecture in 
Munich in July 1902 on the “dispute between logicians and psychologists”,13 a lecture that is 
credited with spurring the Munich Phenomenology (see Smid 1985, 269). 
In an article published in two instalments during 1909 (Enyvvári 1909a, 1909b), Enyvvari 
undertook the task of confronting Palagyi’s critique of Husserl. Because of the proposed 
reduction of the “formalist” position to Bolzano, the main thrust of Palagyi’s argumentation 
was directed against Bolzano’s theory of logic, especially against Bolzano’s Fundamentallehre, 
which is expounded in Part One of the first volume of the magnificent Wissenschaftslehre 
                                                 
11 It is an interesting question of how Palagyi (and other Hungarians) became aware of Bolzano in the years 
immediately after the turn of the century and whether osmotic transmission mechanisms from the original 
Bolzano-Circle, which never totally disappeared in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, played any role in this 
process. Both Palagyi and Enyvvari were members of the scarcely documented Bolzanoist philosophical circle 
in Budapest, called “BEMBE,” which is reported as active between 1909 and 1914 (Somos 1999, 597 ff.), 
Somos, however, believes that the interest in Bolzano was initiated by Husserl’s work (ibid.). 
12 Palagyi claimed that Husserl, despite his explicit praise of Bolzano in the Logical Investigations, concealed 
the “origin” (Provenienz) of his own position (Palágyi 1902b, 16). Such remarks were apparently taken by 
Husserl as a hint at intellectual plagiarism: “In a series of hints which would be insignificant taken separately, 
but which are efficacious when taken in sequence, he gives the reader no less a notion than that I have exploited 
Bolzano in a dishonest manner and have kept silent about my dependence upon him [in unredlicher Weise 
ausgenützt, aber meine Abhängigkeit von ihm verschwiegen habe].” (Husserl 1979, 155, ET: 1994a, 200). 
13 Daubert 2002, 344, ET: 345. Daubert did not explicitly refer to Palagyi’s book. 
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(Bolzano 1837). For Palagyi, Bolzano’s proposition in itself (Satz an sich), the basic building-
block of Bolzano’s logical theory, is the result of a twofold abstraction:  
„Zunächst müssen wir von dem sprachlichen Ausdruck eines Satzes absehen, so dass uns bloss 
der Sinn desselben zurückbleibt; dann aber müssen wir vermittelst einer zweiten Abstraktion bei 
jenem Sinn davon absehen, dass er von jemandem gedacht wurde […].“14 
Palagyi finds even the first tier of abstraction objectionable, since he believes that the meaning 
of a proposition could never subsist as an “independent psychical phenomenon,” “detached 
from any accompanying signs, vocal presentations etc.” (Palágyi 1902a, 32). This stance of his 
has earned him credits from interpreters belongs to a broadly conceived linguistic turn (see e.g. 
Nyíri 1999); and it might also be compelling to perceive a certain resemblance between 
Palagyi’s views and such claims of Reinach like that the “act of meaning” is “always 
linguistically clothed [sprachlich eingekleidet]” (Reinach 1911, 206, English translation 
(hereafter: ET): 1982, 323; cf. Smith 1987, 194). Palagyi has, a a more technical objection 
against the second tier: even the “naked sense,”  which has taken off its “garb of language” 
(Palágyi 1902a, 33), is still thought by somebody (metaphorically speaking, it still has a “skin 
of a thought” [Gedankenhaut]). In order to distil a proposition in itself, we have to abstract from 
this relation as well; but then the proposition in itself becomes per definitionem unintelligible. 
In other words, there is something at the roots of our cognition that is  not part of it – yet 
something that is supposed to define our cognition. As Palagyi summarized this apparent 
contradiction: 
„Wenn ich nämlich eine Wahrheit an sich erkenne, so hat die Wahrheit, die ich erkannt habe, im 
Sinne der Definition Bolzano’s zugleich Existenz und auch keine Existenz. Als ‚Wahrheit an 
sich‘ hat sie nämlich kein Dasein, als gedachte Wahrheit jedoch ist sie eine reale Erscheinung in 
meinem Gemüte.“15 
This is where Enyvari’s defence sets in, consisting in a careful reconstruction of Bolzano’s 
theory of meaning on Husserlian grounds. The meaning of a word, says Enyvvari in a section 
entitled “Remarks on the phenomenology of the theory of meaning,” is not to be sought in the 
presentations accompanying it, but rather in the intentional act which underpins meaningful 
word-consciousness. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish between sense-bestowing or 
                                                 
14 Palágyi 1902a, 32. 
15 Palágyi 1902a, 34. 
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fulfilling act and “a meaning in specie, which is a concept in logical sense” (Enyvvári 1909a, 
320). The latter is the “identical sense,” or, more technically, “the identity of the meaning-
species;” and this is where Enyvvari refers to Husserl’s Logical Investigations for the first time. 
According to Enyvvari, “Bolzano’s doctrine of the propositions in itself was essentially 
misunderstood by Palagyi” (Enyvvári 1909a, 321), because what Bolzano’s proposition in itself 
amounts to is precisely “the meaning in specie, the meaning as an ideal identical unity” (ibid.). 
Palagyi overlooked that, according to Bolzano, the proposition in itself and a proposition in 
thought stand “not in a real connection, but rather only in an ideal relation” to each other (ibid.).  
Enyvvari’s defence of Bolzano (and thereby of Husserl), I think, is entirely legitimate, as 
Bolzano clearly distinguished between a proposition in itself (Satz an sich) and a proposition 
in thought (gedachter Satz) precisely by pointing out that the latter is the “content” (Inhalt) of 
the former (Bolzano 1837, I:78). This distinction runs through the whole Fundamentallehre of 
Bolzano’s work, and it clearly comes to the fore in Bolzano’s treatment of presentations 
(Vorstellungen), which are derived by Bolzano from propositions. Here Bolzano contrasts the 
presentation in itself (Vorstellung an sich), or objective presentation, with the possessed 
(gehabte), thought (gedachte), or subjective presentation:  
“The subjective presentation is thus something real, […] it has a real existence in the subject for 
whom it is present […]. This is not true of the objective presentation or presentation in itself, 
which belongs to every subjective presentation. I mean by it something not to be sought in the 
realm of actuality, something that makes up the direct and immediate material [Stoff] of the 
subjective presentation.”16 
The only way Palagyi could have constructed the above (quoted) contradiction was thus by 
conflating a distinction clearly drawn by Bolzano. But Enyvvari was also aware of the contexts 
and limits of Bolzano’s logical theory. At the end of the first instalment (Enyvvári 1909a, 326), 
he clearly warned against the Herbartian transformation of Bolzano’s ideas by Robert 
Zimmermann (1824-1898), Bolzano’s erstwhile protégé, who is usually credited as the main 
transmitter of Bolzano’s philosophy. Given that it was only recently that a more nuanced view 
of Zimmermann’s role won recognition in academic scholarship (cf. Morscher 1997), 
Enyvvari’s warning really counts as an expert-level knowledge of the intricate relationships of 
19th century Austrian philosophy (which also manifested itself in a bibliography of primary and 
                                                 
16 Bolzano 1837, I:217, ET (mod.): 1973, 78. 
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secondary literature on Bolzano, published by Enyvvari three years later: Enyvvári 1912a). 
Enyvvari was, by the way, also aware of Frege’s, as well as terminological differences between 
Frege’s “Bedeutung,” which, in the phenomenological parlance, amounts to the intended object, 
while Frege’s “Sinn” to “the meaning (or sense) bestowing, respectively fulfilling act” 
(Enyvvári 1909a, 319, n. 1). 
Husserl’s counter-critique was warmly greeted by his academic contacts, who generally viewed 
Palagyi’s accusations as hasty and unfair (cf. Husserl 1994b, V:198, VI:447). Regrettably, it is 
not known whether Husserl had been aware of the glaring defence of his by the another 
Hungarian philosopher. But, for Enyvvari, the stage was set for Göttingen. 
3 Historical Traces of a Semester in Göttingen 
At the end of the second instalment of his article, Enyvvari has already included “Göttingen” 
in his signature (Enyvvári 1909b, 411), presumably to inform Hungarian philosophical 
audience that he is now studying directly at the sources of his new-found philosophical 
conviction. According to archival records,17 Enyvvari attended the following classes in the 
winter semester of 1909/1910 (starting from October, 18, 1909 and March 3, 1910): 
– Edmund Husserl: Kant und die nachkantische Philosophie 
– Edmund Husserl: Philosophische Übungen über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
– Georg Elias Müller: Psychologie 
– Georg Elias Müller: Experimentelle physiologische Übungen 
– Adolf Reinach: Einleitung in die Erkenntnistheorie 
Enyvvari  thus assembled an enviable curriculum, including not only Husserl’s two philosophy 
classes, but also Reinach’s very first university lecture course (cf. K. Schuhmann and Smith 
1987, 17). Furthermore, the letter of recommendation issued to Enyvvari by Husserl himself on 
the day before Enyvvari’s exmatriculation (see Appendix) is also worth of our attention: not 
only because of the praising words by the otherwise parsimonious Husserl, but also because of 
Husserl’s last particular praising phrase – “enthusiastic interest in the most difficult problems 
of epistemology” – could hint at the possible focus of Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen.  
The period Enyvvari spent in Göttingen fell into a gap between the first wave of initial 
                                                 
17 Cf. Ms. Göttingen University Archive, draft Abgangszeugnis 1910, Nr. 859, as well as the Abgangszeugnis 
itself  (in private possession). 
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enthusiasm (the so-called Munich invasion of Göttingen in 1905 and its repercussions) and the 
steady growth of the new Movement in the immediate pre-war years. Even newcomers like 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, who had first arrived in Göttingen in SS 1909, moved back to Munich 
and came back only in the following summer semester. The majority of the early 
phenomenologists arrived only in subsequent semesters, e.g. Hedwig Martius in WS 1910/11, 
most of them even later. Nonetheless Enyvvari managed to meet some of the early 
phenomenologists and participate at the discussions of the nascent Göttingen Philosophical 
Society (that might have been formally set up during Enyvvari’ stay, cf. Conrad 1992, 78, 84); 
and the discussions proved fateful for him. The details of his encounters, as Imentioned earlier, 
are reported directly by Enyvvari in a footnote of his next published work. I quote this footnote 
in its entirety:  
“The present author has, at an earlier occasion […] [Enyvvári 1909a, 1909b], interpreted the 
notion of the unity of meaning in Husserl’s terms. He supposed that the unity of meaning is a 
‘meaning-species’ (a general notion), corresponding to an ‘individual meaning moment’ of a 
meaning-experience, and that it is obtained by a generalising abstraction, which, with regard to 
the ‘individual meaning moment’ of a meaning-experience, intends the corresponding ‘meaning-
species.’ His discussions with Privatdozent A. Reinach and Mr. Th. Conrad (Munich) in the 
‘Philosophical Society of Göttingen’ led him to the conclusion that Husserl’s explanation of the 
phenomenological origins of the unity of meaning is false.”18 
Enyvvari, as it were, went to Rome as a believer but came back as a heretic. What is more 
important philosophically is the underlying philosophical consideration – and whether it has 
anything to do with Enyvvari’s reliance on Bolzano. In order to answer these questions, I will 
look into the historical-philosophical situation that Enyvvari encountered at Husserl in 1909-
1910. 
4 The Göttingen constellation around Husserl in 1909/10 and Enyvvari’s role in it: 
Bolzano and the Noematic Sense of Meaning 
4.1 The Outlines of Husserl’s Trajectory and His Relation to Bolzano as Its Marker 
“Bolzano apparently lacked clarity in the relation of proposition [Satz] to judgement [Urteil] as 
                                                 
18 Enyvvári 1910, 194, n. 1. The printed version reads “W. Conrad,” but Enyvvari corrected it in his own offprint 
copy to “Th. Conrad” (cf. note  above). 
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an act. At least, I have tried in vain to find decisive passages, which decide on the two 
alternative readings […].” This remarkable comment was made by Husserl in a research note 
written during the preparation of the Logical Investigations in April 1899 (Husserl 2009, 138–
139). It testifies that, notwithstanding the powerful language of Husserl’s influential invocation 
of Bolzano in the Logical Investigations (cf. Künne 1997, 40 ff.), Husserl was uncertain as to 
what was actually implied by Bolzano’s  doctrine. What was at stake, furthermore, was of 
fundamental philosophical importance, as demonstrated by Husserl’s retrospective remarks: In 
the Ideas I, written 14 years later, Husserl remarked that, in hindsight, he found his Logical 
Investigations to be “one-sidedly” noetic (cf. Husserl 1975, 13–14, 1976, 217). Given that the 
principle of noetic-noematic correlation is the fundamental tenet of transcendental 
phenomenology,19 Husserl’s characterisation of his earlier opus magnum was clearly intended 
to mark his transition to a new philosophical standpoint which rendered the earlier book 
obsolete (he indeed tried to rewrite it). What is even more intriguing is that this general 
shortcoming of his Logical Investigations was linked by Husserl to a specific failure of Bolzano, 
namely Bolzano’s inability to make “clear to himself the proper sense of” judgement in itself 
and proposition in itself, in other words “that we have here two essentially possible 
interpretations” of judgement in itself: “the specific essence of the judging process (the noetic 
idea) and the noematic idea correlative to the noetic idea” (Husserl 1976, 218, n. 1, ET: 1982, 
230, n. 38). It is precisely this distinction that was anticipated by the aforementioned 
alternatives considered by Husserl in 1899: “the proposition is either the judgement in specie 
or the content that is common to presentations, judgements, wishes and questions etc. relating 
to the same state of affairs [Sachverhalt]” (Husserl 2009, 139).  
Both the anticipated distinction of 1899 and the distinction underlying his self-critique in 1913 
differs significantly from what we find in the first edition of the second volume of the Logical 
Investigations, published in 1901: Here Husserl distinguished between states of affairs as 
intentional correlates of judgement acts and the specific essence of these acts themselves, 
derived via abstraction based on the significational essence (bedeutungsmäßiges Wesen) of 
meaning-bestowing intentional experiences, which yields meaning (Bedeutung) in the proper 
                                                 
19 Among the many formulations of this principle by Husserl, it is worth to highlight his retrospective claim from 
1935-1936, according to which “[t]he first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between 
experienced object and manners of givenness […] occurred during work on my Logical Investigations around 
1898” (Husserl 1962, 169, n. 1, ET: 1970, 166, n.; cf., e.g., Moran 2003, esp. 56 ff.). 
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phenomenological sense. Let us look into the details of this conception: Apart from specific 
cases of introspection, the act itself, which is defined by Husserl as an experience exhibiting 
the descriptive property of intentionality (Husserl 1984a, 392), does not coincide with its 
intentional object (414),  as demonstrated by the fact that very different mental experiences are 
capable of presenting the same intentional object in virtue of differences in the apprehension 
(Auffassung, 396). In case of judgements, e.g., “when we say that the knife is on the table,” the 
knife is the intentional object of the subject of the judgement (Urteilssubjekt), i.e., “the knife is 
the object about which we judge,” but the “full and entire object corresponding to the whole 
judgement is the state of affairs [Sachverhalt] judged” (416, ET: Husserl 2001a, II, 114). The 
same state of affairs could furthermore be the intentional object of the corresponding 
presentation of the knife being on the table, the wish “that the knife should be on the table,” the 
corresponding question etc. (ibid.). The state of affairs obviously differs from the presentation 
of a judgement, the intentional object of which is judgement, i.e., a mental act.  
Johannes Dauber rightly pointed out in his aforementioned lecture on the occasion of Palagyi’s 
psychologistic anti-critique in 1902 that the proper response to the psychologistic challenge 
hinges on further refining this initial distinction, namely “on the answer to the question as to 
how in a judicative act […] we are to think the relationship between the psychological act and  
what is intentionally posited therein, the intentional object, and especially the intentional 
content, the meaning [Bedeutung]” (Daubert 2002, 364, ET (mod.): 365). Concerning the latter, 
third element, Husserl’s proposal was to conceive meaning as a result of a special type of 
abstraction (hence the term “in specie”), performed upon the non-independent parts of the acts, 
termed significational essence, which consist of the matter and quality of the acts (cf. Husserl 
1984a, 431). Propositions (Sätze) are a particular categorial type of meanings. In a strict sense, 
Husserl says, truth concerns propositions, while being (Sein) concerns states of affairs as their 
correlates (cf. Husserl 1984b, 655). It is the state of affairs that serves as the truthmaker of a 
proposition, respectively the evidential fulfilment of a judgement itself constitutes a (different) 
state of affairs (cf. 654). 
Already Reinach conjectured that this clear-cut distinction, as applied at judgements, only 
gradually emerged during the composition of the Logical Investigations (Reinach 1911, 224, 
n.). The fact that in 1899 Husserl was considering a different distinction that posited a further 
element – that differed from the mental act, the specific meaning and the state of affairs –, 
namely “the uniformity that can be characterised as a relation to the same state of affairs but in 
different relational modes” (Husserl 2009, 139), seems to indicate that the printed text merely 
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represents a particular crystallisation of Husserl’s otherwise fluid network of concepts (which 
are, in fact, surprisingly close to Husserl’s more mature ones).20 The other side of the same coin 
is, then, that a personal visitor to Göttingen was able to participate in the underlying fluid 
process of conceptual development. 
4.2 Micro-analysis of Husserl’s Development around Enyvvari’s Stay 
There are many signs indicating that the incubation of Husserl’s explicit distinction between 
the noematic idea of the judgement and the noetic idea of the specific essence of the judging 
process reached a critical stage precisely around academic year 1909-1910 and that this 
ascertainment process was linked to his ongoing occupation with Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre. 
Let us take a closer look at this historical development and the underlying philosophical 
considerations!21 Already in his lecture course Bedeutungslehre (Theory of Meanings) in SS 
1908, Husserl proposed a “parallel expression” of meaning which “is a pure correlation to the 
notion of meaning in the sense of species” (Husserl 1987, 38). The distinction is made between 
“meaning […] as a specific unity” (31), which is a result of the abstraction performed upon the 
meaning moments of the singular unities of judgements as mental acts (cf. 32), and “something 
that is correlatively opposed to the act on the objective side” (35), which Husserl termed “the 
categorial objectivity of the corresponding expression” and distinguished from the “objectivity 
that is simply meant [bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit schlechthin]” (37).  
Husserl’s reasons for establishing this distinction did not lie in the problem considered in 1899 
(cf. Husserl 2009, 126–127), i.e., that it is possible for us to intentionally relate to the same state 
of affairs in specifically different acts (e.g. judgements, presentations, questions etc.). Husserl, 
as seen above, explicitly acknowledged this possibility in the printed text of the Logical 
Investigations, and the reason why it did not pose any problem for him was that in the printed 
                                                 
20 This tripartite distinction between judgement in specie, uniformity of a relation to the same state of affairs, 
and state of affair itself is richer and more specific than the equivocacy that Husserl, as Robin D. Rollinger 
pointed out, diagnosed between “sentences in themselves […] regarded as the objects” of thought and 
sentences in themselves “regarded as the species of these thoughts, more precisely of judgements” (Rollinger 
1999, 80).  
21 Even the most detailed developmental analysis available so far (Mohanty 2008, 224–241) has a very narrow 
textual basis, respectively is not fine-grained enough for our purposes, not to mention the commentaries on 
Husserl’s Ideas I (cf. Ricoeur 1996, 138; Moran 2015, 221). Anchors are provided by the respective editorial 
introductions, see esp. Husserl 1984c, xxiii ff., 1987, xvii ff., 1996, xxxiii ff., 2009, xxxiv ff.. 
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text Husserl proposed a sophisticated analysis of compound acts, in which he confined the 
object-giving function to certain intellectual acts (cf. Melle 1990). In compound acts, non-
object giving acts merely contribute to the resulting compound quality, whereas the matter is 
contributed by the so-called objectifying acts, i.e., positing or non-positing nominal or 
predicative acts (Husserl 1984a, 515 ff.). Hence the matter of objectifying acts – which is a 
non-independent part of their significational essence – is, to a certain extent, capable of 
performing the function that Husserl in 1899 tried to make independent under the headword 
“the uniformity that can be characterised as a relation to the same state of affairs but in different 
relational modes” (Husserl 2009, 138). Correspondingly, in the lecture course in 1908 Husserl 
claims that it is possible to grasp “this shared ideal moment” by an “overarching consciousness” 
(Husserl 1987, 34).  
What is then Husserl’s reason in 1908 for drawing a distinction between meaning in species 
and the corresponding categorial objectivity? It lies in the infamous example of “the victor at 
Jena” – “the vanquished at Waterloo.” Presentations having different contents (Inhalt) but the 
same extension (Umfang) were commonplace in nineteenth-century academic logic (cf., e.g., 
Bolzano 1837, I, 445 ff.), and in the printed text of the Logical Investigations, Husserl himself 
got over this example by claiming that “names can differ in meaning  but can name the same 
object” (Husserl 1984a, 53, ET: 2001a, I, 197). In 1908, he acknowledged that, even though the 
“object simply [Gegenstand schlechthin]” is the same, we do not mean it in the same way, the 
“subject [Theme] that is before our eyes” is different (Husserl 1987, 36). This line of argument 
resembles a sophisticated distinction in the printed text of the Logical Investigations, namely 
that of between “the object as it is intended [Gegenstand sowie er intendiert ist]” and the “object 
(period) which is intended [schlechthin der Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist];” or, in a 
different terminology, between “intentional and extra-intentional content of the object” 
(Husserl 1984a, 414–415, ET: 2001a, 113–114). The surplus Husserl intended to capture via 
this distinction consists in precisely the possibility of various ways of meaning an object – e.g, 
“the German Emperor” and “the grandson of Queen Victoria” –, where the identity of the 
intended object – e.g., Kaiser Wilhelm II – is revealed only “in virtue of an objective unity of 
knowledge” (ibid.). The crux is that the “object as it is intended” is an objective determination 
that cannot yet be identified with the object itself (the object simply), thus anticipating Husserl’s 
corresponding idea in 1908 and his later full-fledged notion of noema. 
It apparently took time for the full-fledged recognition of this distinction to prove effectual for 
Husserl. Both Husserl’s cumbersome terminology in 1908 and his rudimentary argumentation 
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is indicative of a distinction that was still in statu nascendi.22 In the introductory lecture course 
Alte und neue Logik (Modern and ancient logic), which was delivered in WS 1908/09, Husserl 
restrained himself from discussing his newly developed ideas on the two-fold sense of 
meaning.23 That the lack of these ideas was perceived by Husserl as one of the shortcomings of 
his lecture course is demonstrated by a retrospective note to his manuscripts, in which Husserl 
asked the question “What is the relation between the theory of meaning and the theory of the 
essences of judgements as such?” and concluded that his elaboration still lacked the 
“completely clear inner unity of all the problems” (Husserl 2003, 96, n. 1). 
There is, however, a clear instance of terminus ante quem for Husserl’s recognition of the full-
fledged distinction, namely WS 1910/1911, when Husserl lectured on Logik als Theorie der 
Erkenntnis (Logic as a Theory of Knowledge). In this lecture course Husserl not only clearly 
distinguished between “ideal singularities” of judgements (Husserl 1996, 37) and the 
“proposition [Satz]” (42), but also provided a more systematic phenomenological argument in 
favour of it: Normally, we are dedicated to our intentional objects, we are immersed in them. It 
is possible, however, for us to interrupt this state and to direct our attention to, e.g., the judging 
itself: “the gaze must be turned away from the object and and turned back to the ego and its 
acts” (42). What manifests itself in this perspective in virtue of the corresponding abstraction 
is the “idea of judging as an essential generality [Wesensallgemeines] of the reflexion” (ibid.). 
It is possible, furthermore, to invert this perspective that originates from the judging and direct 
                                                 
22 The published text of Husserl’s lecture course of 1908 contains a more pronounced terminology, namely the 
distinction between “phansical [phansisch]” and “ontical [ontisch]” (Husserl 1987, 38); though these terms 
are later additions by Husserl. The adjective “phansical” was employed by Husserl for a short time around 
1909-1910 to denote the investigation of mental acts according to their “immanent-real content [reellen 
Bestand]” (Husserl 2005a, 157, cf. 58 n., 65). Husserl intended to coin the terminus technicus φάνσις, in 
opposition to the more widespread term φαινόμενον (which he translated as “[das] Erscheinenden” or “[die] 
Erscheinung”), in order to denote “the appearing itself as an experience [das Erscheinen selbst als Erlebnis]” 
(Husserl 1988, 307–308). Husserl actively used this terminology during Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen (e.g., 
Husserl 2004, 235, 241, 258, 2005b, 238, 258–259), thus Enyvvari unsurprisingly picked it up as early as in 
1910 (cf. Enyvvári 1910, 184). Husserl continued to sporadically employ it in 1911-1912 (Husserl 1980, 313, 
2009, 291, 300), but he later denounced it (e.g., Husserl 2012a, 465, n. 1) and explicitly replaced it by the 
adjective “noetical” (e.g., Husserl 2005b, 238, n. 3, 2009, 300, n. 1; unpublished manuscript Ms. M III 12 / 7-
8). 
23 According the assessments by Elisabeth Schuhmann (Husserl 2003, viii) and Ursula Panzer (Husserl 1996, 
xxxiv, n. 2). 
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our gaze at “what is judged in the judging,” e.g. when one says “What is judged by you now is 
a universal proposition” (ibid). Such judgements are about the proposition itself, rather than the 
original object of the proposition (cf. 44). The latter, the objectivity or state of affairs intended 
by the judgement may exist or may not exist  in the reality, without affecting the former, “that 
which is posited by the judgement as such” (45), or, as Husserl later said, “the noema of the 
judgement” (411). Indicating his full awareness of the extent of his discovery, Husserl then 
reproached traditional logic for failing to distinguish not only between the logical and 
psychological sense of judgement – i.e., the anti-psychologistic critique that was presented in 
the hugely influential first volume of the Logical Investigations, published in 1900 – but also 
between “judging and proposition” (43). 
The estimated date of the full recognition of the distinction by Husserl could be pushed back 
closer to Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen, based on a series of observations. One testimony is the 
unpublished manuscript Ms. A I 42, written around June 1910 (cf. K. Schuhmann 1977, 142), 
in which Husserl tried to reconcile this distinction with his advances in his theory of essences.24 
Furthermore, the dissertations of Erich Heinrich (born in 1881), who passed his doctoral 
examination at Husserl on February 3, 1909, distinguished explicitly between meaning 
(Bedeutung) that is derived by a reflexion and ideation (abstraction) from the mental acts and 
an “objective-logical” meaning, even though he used the term proposition (Satz) for the former 
(Heinrich 1910, 29–31). Husserl was supervising the dissertation of Heinrich in as late as in 
July 1909 (cf. K. Schuhmann 1977, 127). Finally, in a text written in October – December 1909 
(i.e., exactly during Enyvvari’s stay), which is dedicated to the perceptual noema, there is a 
clear distinction between the judgement in specie and the “logical judgement (Husserl 2004, 
251, cf. 245, 1987, 145). 
The most intriguing aspect of this micro-development was the sudden flip in Husserl’s attitude 
towards Bolzano, which run exactly parallel with the ascertainment process analysed above. 
All passages before ca. Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen are marked by Husserl’s manifest 
uncertainty about whether he was right in depending on Bolzano as a precursor of the 
noematical sense of meaning, complaining of contradicting passages in Bolzano just like 
Husserl did in 1899.25 In a research note written in 1910, dedicated to securing the “distinction 
                                                 
24 Compare Ms. A I 42 / 31a and Husserl 2012b, 29 ff.. 
25 Husserl 1987, 156 and n. 1 (a research manuscript from 1907), 2012b, 38 (a research manuscript from 
September 1907), 1987, 33 (the SS 1908 lecture course itself). This incertitude in interpreting Bolzano is 
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between the judgement in specie and the intended states of affairs” (Husserl 2009, 155), 
however, Husserl suddenly claimed:  
“Bolzano was right [richtig gesehen] about [the tripartite distinction], as I came to understand it 
in hindsight, after I had became clear in my mind about the phenomenological clarifications. […] 
For what prevented me [from recognising it] was this: the phansical [noetical] interpretation of 
presentation in itself and proposition in itself, which was suggested by him.”26 
Husserl was thus suddenly made certain of the two central tenets of his interpretation of Bolzano 
in the Ideas I: (1) Bolzano’s misleading noetical self-interpretation that also deceived Husserl 
at the time of writing the Logical Investigations, and (2) that, notwithstanding, the genius of 
Bolzano “had the noematic concept in mind” (Husserl 1976, 219, n., ET: 1982, 230, n. 38). In 
the 1910/11 lecture course, Husserl similarly claimed that the second distinction, neglected by 
traditional logic, was “first emphasised by Bolzano,” who, however, did “not rightly grasp” it.27 
Based on the short-lived terminology employed by Husserl, it must have been in the same 
period around Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen that Husserl noted on the inner title page of his 
copy of the Logical Investigations: “For the [planned new] Foreword: That phenomenological 
analysis is taken as phansical (only in this book) […].”28 Given this distinctive development, 
the question arises as to whether the flip in Husserl’s attitude towards Bolzano could have an 
extrinsic trigger as well? 
                                                 
markedly opposed to Husserl’s continued confident references to Bolzano’s fundamental discovery of “the 
distinction between subjective presentations as psychical experiences and logical presentations as ideal unities” 
(Husserl 2001b, 56 (WS 1902/03), cf. 2002a, 14, 70 (SS 1905), 1984c, 143 (WS 1905/06), 2003, 42 (WS 
1908/1909)). The discovery of the latter, simple distinction – essentially, the refutation of the psychologism 
(in contrast to Husserl’s more moderation assessment of Bolzano’s merits in this regards in the Logical 
Investigations itself, Husserl 1975, 226 ff.) – was, after the emergence of the noematic sense of meaning, 
reassigned by Husserl to the Ancient Stoics and Bolzano’s achievement was degraded to a mere rediscovery 
Husserl 2012a, 87. 
26 Husserl 2009, 160. Concerning the adjective “phansical,” see note  above. 
27 According to the student transcript (Ms. N I 3 / 11b), cf. Husserl 1987, 408. 
28 Husserl 1984b, 790. Bolzano as an unconscious forerunner of the noematical sense of meaning also figures in 
Husserl’s influential self-interpretation written in 1913 and first published posthumously in 1939 (Husserl 
2002b, 298–299), even though the bulk of it is dedicated to explicating the dilemma between Platonism and 
psychologism (i.e., the more trivial first distinction). 
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4.3 Enyvvari’s Participation in the Göttingen Constellation in 1909-1910 
We have no reliable information about the contents of the conversations between Enyvvari and 
Husserl that led the otherwise parsimonious Husserl to attest Enyvvari’s “diligence,” 
“competence,” and “enthusiastic dedication to the most difficult problems of epistemology” 
(see Appendix). Such situation is not unusual, as, e.g., we are almost completely in the dark 
about the exact circumstances of the interaction between Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg 
during the formative years 1916-1919, despite the high-profile of the latter among Husserl’s 
students.29 What we know in case of Enyvvari is that he was well versed in the doctrines of 
Bolzano and their contemporaneous interpretations (see Section 2.2 above). Furthermore, just 
before he left for Göttingen, Enyvvari published a review (Enyvvári 1909c) of a doctoral 
dissertation written by Gerhard Gotthardt (Gotthardt 1909). Gotthard (1880-?) obtained his 
doctoral degree under the supervision of Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), Brentano’s arch-student, in 
Berlin in March 1909, so he unsurprisingly aimed at a psychologistic reinterpretation of 
Bolzano’s doctrines, including interpreting the relation between proposition in itself and state 
of affairs as a psychological “emphasis.”30 Enyvvari’s harsh critique of Gotthard, which was 
especially insisting on the origins of proposition in itself(cf. Enyvvári 1909c, 465), must have 
excellently prepared him for what was on the agenda in Göttingen when he arrived. 
Seen from this angle, Enyvvari’s report of his change of mind in Göttingen, quoted in Section 
3 above, might turn out to be misleading about the actual extent of the philosophical interactions 
in Göttingen; even though it was most probably intended by him as a bona fide account of what 
he believed to have learnt during his stay. Both of his interlocutors have namely published 
articles shortly thereafter (Conrad 1910; Reinach 1911) aiming at refining or replacing 
Husserl’s theory of expressions (Ausdruck), rather than establishing the two senses of 
meaning.31 What Enyvvari actually did in the article in which he announced his change of mind 
                                                 
29 Cf., e.g. Thomas Sheehan’s retraction (1997, 17, n. 59) of his oft-cited claim of Heidegger’s “attack” against 
Husserl’s notion of ahistorical pure ego in 1919. 
30 Gotthardt 1909, 27, n. 2; there are question marks at this passage in the copy in the Municipal Library of 
Budapest, where Enyvvari was working. 
31 Concerning Reinach, cf. the table of contents of Husserl’s lost text on Reinach (Husserl 2009, 447; cf. K. 
Schuhmann 1987, 246–247). As pointed out recently (Fabbianelli 2015), Conrad’s distinction between 
Bezeichnung (denoting) and Kennzeichnung (denoting in virtue of alleged ontologically intrinsic properties) 
aimed at transcending Husserl’s both concepts of meaning (222, cf. 209), motivated by “entirely different 
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was, on the other hand, a move towards Bolzano, insofar as Enyvvari opted for a direct 
identification between Bolzano’s proposition in itself and the phenomenological notion of 
meaning (see Enyvvári 1910, 13). Enyvvari’s move could have been heralded as an anticipation 
(or borrowing) of Husserl’s corresponding development, analysed above, if it had not been for 
the fact that Enyvvari never came to distinguish explicitly between the judgement in specie and 
the noematical sense of meaning. His detailed exposition of Husserl’s Ideas breaks off at § 92 
cf. Enyvvári 1913, 53, just before the section entitled “Noesis and Noema in the Realm of 
Judgement” Husserl 1976, 216 ff., which contains Husserl’s references to Bolzano discussed 
above. The entry of meaning (“Jelentés”) in Enyvvari’s philosophical dictionary merely 
distinguished between the subjective act and the identical content of meaning, referring to the 
the Logical Investigations only Enyvvári 1918, 70–71.32 Even though he listed Noema as a 
terminus technicus for Sinn (96), he was apparently unaware of Husserl’s attempts to 
distinguish it from the in specie notion of mental acts.  
The assessment of Enyvvari’s merits in Göttingen thus hinges on the adopted historiographic 
methodology. Barring new historical discoveries, the extant sources do not warrant to speak of 
an unilaterally directed influence of Enyvvari’s knowledge of Bolzano on Husserl’s 
understanding of Bolzano and its role in the emergence of the distinction between the noetical 
and noematical senses of meaning. The possible unilateral influences on Enyvvari by Husserl 
or other members of the nascent Phenomenological Movement are, as I am going to argue 
below (see Section 5), also unspecific or less interesting. Yet, to say that nothing historically 
relevant happened in Göttingen in 1909-1910 would amount to a failure caused by an 
inadequate historiographical toolbox. One methodology that holds the promise of capturing the 
historical circumstances interwoven with Husserl’s conceptual micro-development 
reconstructed above is the so-called Konstellationsforschung, whose attention is directed at 
genuine philosophical constellations that are  characterised by a “dense connection of mutually 
interacting persons, ideas, theories, problems, and documents” in a manner that does not allow 
for an isolated identification of achievements or developments (Mulsow 2005, 74). While 
                                                 
conceptions of phenomenology” (224), i.e., methodological opposition between Husserl’s Aktphänomenologie 
and the Gegenstandsphänomenologie that the Munich-based circle of Early Phenomenologists strived for. 
32 As the correspondence with his publisher demonstrates, the manuscript was already finished in November 
1916, or presumably even earlier, the publication being delayed due to the war (Ms. National Széchényi 
Library (OSZK) Fond 2/375). 
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Husserl admittedly assumed an asymmetrically more relevant role (at least for the scholarship 
of phenomenology), it is I think compelling to consider the interactions of the Early 
Phenomenologists with Husserl and each other as a genuine instance of philosophical 
constellation. From the point of view of such methodology, Enyvvari appears as a fully entitled 
participant of this constellation, particularly of the micro-constellation in 1909-1910 
concerning the development of the noematical sense of meaning and Bolzano’s role in it. The 
specific nature of his input could then consisted in bringing in Bolzano to the debate and settling 
down the interpretation of Bolzano’s proposition in itself, 33  which is missing, e.g., from 
Heinrich’s dissertation. 
The side lesson lesson of investigating Enyvvari’s participation in the Göttingen phase of the 
Phenomenological Movement is, beyond the highly technical constellation on the noematical 
sense of meaning and Bolzano as its forerunner, the need for a more sophisticated 
historiographical methodology. Before commenting on this observation, let us take a quick look 
at Enyvvari’s work after his return from Göttingen in March 1910. 
 
5 Epilogue: Enyvvari’s Failed Creative Foray in 1911-1914 
From the point of Enyvvari’s own view of his literary output, we have been wasting our efforts 
so far on his preparatory writings.34 What he himself perceived as his specific contribution to 
philosophy was twofold: The first of them was the identification and characterisation of a new 
class of “phenomenological givennesses”. 35 They cannot be analysed using the “technique of 
direct description but only through negations and similes” (1911a, 114) and are neither 
intentional (related to something transcendental) nor related to an ego (1911a, 116). They are 
only apprehended as  presenting experiences by a subsequent reflection. Enyvvari calls them 
                                                 
33 From this point of view, Enyvvari’s insistence on passages at Bolzano linking proposition in itself and 
meaning (cf. Enyvvári 1910, 14–15) are particularly telling clues. 
34 Cf., e.g., his self-references at Enyvvári 1913, 10, n. 2, 48, n. 1, 1918, 59. 
35 First put forward: Enyvvári 1911a; further substantiated: 1912b). Enyvvari quoted the essay of Theodor 
Conrad (1881-1869), an elusive member of the Phenomenological Movement whom Enyvvari met in 
Göttingen (Conrad 1911; cf. Enyvvári 1912b, 98, n. 1). Since Conrad, however, completely rejected Husserl’s 
framework of intentional analysis of perceptions and presentations (Conrad 1911, 64 n.),  it was mistaken for 
Enyvvari to rely on Conrad in trying to amend Husserl’s framework. 
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“presences” (jelenlévők), i.e. something standing on the border between past and future, 
because they “lack temporal givenness” (1911a, 118). Phenomenological examples of 
presences are provided by “passive states of mind, e.g. being obliviously immersed into 
something or star-gazing” (1911a, 120). Enyvvari’s second perceived specific contribution 
(Enyvvári 1911b) was namely that he intended to utilize the class of phenomenological 
givenness delineated above to amend Husserl’s eidetics.  More precisely, Enyvvari believed his 
special class of intuitive content, which is not yet fully apprehended, could serve as an intuitive 
fulfilling element directly for the eidetic act, without requiring the mediation of founding acts. 
This is what he presented as his own creative contribution in his only German article (Enyvvári 
1914, esp. 142), which is essentially a summary of the aforementioned Hungarian articles. 
I do not believe that it was merely for contingent reasons that this essay of Enyvvari got omitted 
from the bibliography section of Husserl’s Encyclopaedia Britannica article. First of all, by 
1914 Husserl had already got over the problem Enyvvari was trying to solve. As the recently 
published edition of Husserl’s research manuscripts on eidetics prove, Husserl’s had devised 
the notion of eidetic variation around 1912, together with that of a typical essence that guides 
the former process Husserl 2012b, 56 ff.. Furthermore, Enyvvari also ignored the hints the Sixth 
Investigation could have provided (see e.g. Lohmar 2008): Enyvvari was not trying to solve the 
problem of the intuitive fulfilling of categorial elements, but he was trying to explain it away 
by presupposing a magical intuitive content that is capable of doing this job without interfering 
with other levels (i.e. without being apprehended as an individual red). That his proposal is a 
short-cut, rather than a phenomenological explanation, is also proved by the fact that it does 
away with the articulate (gegliedert) founding-founded structure, characteristic of every 
categorial act. 
6 Conclusion and Perspectives: Enyvvari’s Place in the Phenomenological Movement 
Eugen Enyvvari perfectly represents those genuinely interesting figures who fell through the 
research net during the first major phase of the historiography of phenomenology. Thus it is 
part of the task of contemporary historians of the Phenomenological Movement to augment the 
pioneering work done by K. Schuhmann, H. Spiegelberg, and their collaborators,  in other 
words, to identify Enyvvari and his forgotten fellow thinkers in order to establish a 
reconstruction of phenomenology based on the widest possible circle of phenomenologists and 
their actual weight, an aim to which I hope the present paper has been able to contribute. This, 
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however, raises the question of assessing the relevance of individual philosophical 
contributions, which, in the case of Enyvvari, is far from being trivial. 
The most striking feature of Enyvvari’s phenomenological oeuvre is the his rich complex 
acquaintance with both the conceptual edifice of Husserl’s phenomenology as presented in the 
Logical Investigations and the historical context in which the latter was embedded. One is 
compelled to compare Husserl’s self-imposed paucity of references to other philosophers – 
especially in his post-1900 works – with the the non-trivial level of Enyvvari’s engagement 
with Bolzano and the late Prague School of Brentano and wonder how Husserl’s relations to 
other contemporaneous strains of thought could have developed, had Enyvvari became 
integrated in the nascent Phenomenological Movement in Göttingen.36 Enyvvari’s failure to 
establish a professional career in philosophy, despite initial promising signs,37 was not merely 
due to his individual luck, but his drifting away from the academia amidst the aftermath of the 
Great War in the 1920s was part of a larger breakdown against left-leaning intellectuals 
(especially against those who, like Enyvvari, engaged themselves in the service of the short-
lived Council Republic in 1919). Even though Enyvvari managed to become a successful 
librarian and, since 1926, acclaimed director of the Municipal Library of Budapest (until he 
was forced to resign in October 1944 when his country was sliding into the total control of 
National Socialism); there certainly remains a historical possibility left unactualized. The 
reception of Enyvvari was, furthermore, particularly affected by the language barrier, since his 
only German publication presented the terminus of his road that led him to conceptual dead-
end (see Section 5 above), while the interesting milestones of his journey, characterised by an 
intense engagement with contemporaneous and historical authors, were published exclusively 
in his mother tongue. 
It is especially Enyvvari’s reply to Palagyi (see Section 2.2) that should have been published in 
German instead. Palagyi’s attack on Husserl reverberated in Germany and was instrumental for 
the birth of the Phenomenological Movement. Enyvvari’s counter-critique not only belongs to 
the full story, but it is easily the most specific reply with regard to both Husserl’s Logical 
                                                 
36 For example, in presenting Husserl’s mature phenomenology, Enyvvari tried to quote Bolzano as a forerunner 
of phenomenology (Enyvvári 1913, 37, n. 1). 
37 In January 1915,0 e.g., he was officially nominated as a corresponding member of the prestigious Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences by two of his former teachers, Imre Pauer and Bernát Alexander (themselves ordinary, 
respectively corresponding members of the Academy). 
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Investigations and Bolzano. Enyvvari stay in Göttingen was, too, far from being in vain. Based 
on a micro-analysis of the development of Husserl’s understanding of judgement acts and their 
meanings around 1909-1910, including the change of his relation to Bolzano as a marker of this 
development, it is possible reconstruct a historical-philosophical constellation which Enyvvari 
was part of in virtue of his deep interest in Bolzano’s role in understanding the “unity of 
meaning” (see Section 4). Even though it is neither possible to formulate Enyvvari’s 
contributions in terms of unidirectional influences nor does Enyvvari later work mirror 
Husserl’s noematical-noetical distinction, an adequate historiographic methodology might 
allow us to grasp the historical reality that underlie Enyvvari’s “enthusiastic dedication to the 
most difficult problems of epistemology” in Göttingen that led him to “capture [Husserl’s] 
special sympathies.” Employing such sophisticated methodology could, by the way, benefit the 
historiography of Early Phenomenology in general. 
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Appendix: Edmund Husserl’s Certificate and Postcard to Eugen Enyvvari 
 
Certificate (Husserl’s handwriting): 
 
Zeugnis. | 
Herr Enyvvári Jenö aus Budapest, | welcher in diesem Wintersemester | zur Vertiefung seiner 
philosophischen | Bildung an unserer Georgia Augusta | studierte, hat sich durch außerordent-
|lichen Eifer und Fleiß, durch seine | Gründlichkeit u<nd> Tüchtigkeit, durch seine | begeisterte 
Hingabe an die schwierig-|sten Probleme der Erkenntniskritik | meine besonderen Sympathien 
erworben. | Seine künftige wissenschaftliche Entwicklung | lässt das Beste erhoffen, wenn ihm, 
was | er sehr verdient, entsprechende Förderung | zu Theil wird. | 
Göttingen, den 2. März 1910 | 
 Dr E. Husserl | 
 o. ö. Professor an der Uni-|versität 
 
 
Postcard (Postal stamp: Göttingen; August 14, 1913; reproduction of a signed photography of 
Edmund Husserl, text in Husserl’s handwriting):  
 
Mit freundlichstem | Gruß an | 
Herrn Eugen | Enyvvári | 
Göttingen<,> 13.8.<19>13 
